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Sokolik: Division of Marital Property on Divorce: A Proposal to Revise Sec

DIVISION OF MARITAL PROPERTY ON DIVORCE:
A PROPOSAL TO REVISE SECTION 3.63
J. BRIAN SOKOLIK

The manner in which courts have historically dealt with the division of the
property of the spouses upon divorce calls for a revision of our divorce statutes. In most jurisdictions the husband is the one who "pays" for the divorce
in the majority of cases. Such payment may be in the form of alimony, or
of an unequal division of the property of the spouses, or both depending on
the jurisdiction. Some jurisdictions penalize a spouse for transgressions of
cruel treatment or adulterous conduct.' Many jurisdictions justify the un2
equal treatment afforded the spouses in the name of equity.
Nowhere does the unequal division of property in divorce suits appear to
be more unjust than in a community property state such as Texas. 3 Property
rights and the equality of the spouses regarding those rights are the very cornerstones of the community property system. 4 Texas is unique even as a
community property state in that it has no provision for permanent alimony, 5
therefore the subject matter of property awards on divorce in Texas is necessarily confined to court ordered division of property.(
1. E.g., IDAHO CODE ANN. § 32-712(2), (3) (Supp. 1974).
2. See, e.g., Stephens v. Stephens, 288 S.W.2d 957, 959 (Ark. 1956); Hartman v.
Hartman, 34 N.W.2d 137, 139 (Wis. 1948). See generally 27B C.J.S. Divorce §
291(1), at 260 (1959); 24 AM. Ju. 2d Divorce and Separation § 925, at 1052, 1053

(1966).
3. The other community property states are Arizona, California, Idaho, Louisiana,

Nevada, New Mexico and Washington.

and Inter-Spousal Transactions, 19

BAYLOR

Vaughn, The Policy of Community Property

L. REV. 20 (1967).

4. W. DE FUNIAK & M. VAUGHN, PRINCIPLES OF COMMUNITY PROPERTY §

11.1, at

24 (2d ed. 1971); Vaughn, The Policy of Community Property and Inter-Spousal Transactions, 19 BAYLOR L. REV. 20, 40 (1967).
5. Currently TEx. FAMILY CODE ANN. § 3.59 (1975) only contains a provision for

temporary alimony. The statute allows for payments in support of the wife and discriminates against the husband by allowing him the same "if he is unable to support himself." It appears that a husband must be incapacitated whereas a wife may receive temporary payments whenever necessary. Permanent alimony has been held to be against
public policy in Texas. Francis v. Francis, 412 S.W.2d 29, 32 (Tex. 1967); Brunell v.
Brunell, 494 S.W.2d 621, 623 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1973, no writ).
6. In addition to a court ordered division of property, the parties are permitted to
draft their own property settlement as well as contract for permanent alimony. Francis
v. Francis, 412 S.W.2d 29, 33 (Tex. 1967); Shaw v. Shaw, 483 S.W.2d 825, 826 (Tex.
Civ; App.-San Antonio 1972, no writ). Child support which is normally incident to
a divorce is clearly distinguishable in its use and purpose from the adjustment of property rights between the parties and therefore will not be covered in this comment.
Texas has a separate statute which provides for the custody and support of the children
of spouses undertaking a divorce action. See Tax. FAMILY CODE ANN. § 3.55 (1975).
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Texas inherited, by way of Mexico, the Spanish ganancial system of marital
property.8 'In 1836 the Republic of Texas officially provided for the adoption of the common law of England with modifications as the rule of decision
within its constitution, 9 and later provision was made to retain the community
property system of marital rights. 10 The purpose for adopting a system which
is strikingly different from the common law was to provide protection for the
wife so that she did not suffer the same disabilities of coverture which a wife
residing in a common law state had to endure." The common law regarding property rights did not acknowledge the wife as a person capable of holding property; all her rights to her personal property acquired before and after
marriage became her husband's property. 12 The ganancial system on the
other hand, recognized a woman as a distinct person in the eyes of the law
even while married. It protected the wife's right to ownership of property
to the extent that all the separate property of both husband and wife remained separate, and each spouse owned a vested one-half undivided interest
3
in the community property.'
14
The ganancial system is founded on the theory of equality of the spouses.
This system has the attributes of a partnership in which "both partners con7. "Bienes gananciales in Spanish law is that property held in community by husband and wife, having been acquired or gained by them during the marriage." W. DE
FUNIAK & M. VAUGHN, PRINCIPLES OF COMMUNITY PROPERTY § I, at 1, n.2 (2d ed.
1971). For a more extensive coverage of the origins and peculiarities of this system
see W.

DE FUNIAK & M.

VAUGHN, PRINCIPLES OF COMMUNITY

PROPERTY (2d ed. 1971);

McKnight, Texas Community Property Law-Its Course of Development and Reform,
8 CALIF. WEST. L. REV. 117 (1971); Vaughn, The Policy of Community Property and
Inter-Spousal Transactions, 19 BAYLOR L. REV. 20 (1967).
8. McKnight, Texas Community Property Law-Its Course of Development and
Reform, 8 CALIF. WEST. L. REV. 117 (1971).
9. TEX. CONST. art. IV, § 13 (1836).
See also McKnight, Texas Community
Property Law-Its Course of Development and Reform, 8 CALIF. WEST. L. REV. 117,
118-19 (1971).
10. TEX. CONST. art. VII, § 19 (1845).
11. W. DE FUNIAK & M. VAUGHN, PRINCIPLES OF COMMUNITY PROPERTY § 11.1, at
24, 25 (2d ed. 1971); 1 E. OAKES, SPEER'S MARITAL RIGrrs IN TEXAS § 92, at 121 (4th
ed. 1961).
12. H. PLATT, THE PROPERTY RIGHTS OF MARRIED WOMEN § 1, at 1 (1885).
13. Id. § 7, at 5; Vaughn, The Policy of Community Property and Inter-Spousal
Transactions, 19 BAYLOR L. REV. 20, 26, 34 (1967).
14. Vaughn, The Policy of Community Property and Inter-Spousal Transactions, 19
BAYLOR L. REV. 20, 26-27 (1967).
The only inequality within the ganancial system
which can be alleged by opponents of the system is that the wife was not permitted to
manage the assets of the marriage. The husband was the exclusive manager of the community. Proponents of the system reason that biological and practical factors required
the husband to be appointed the business manager. See Vaughn, The Policy of Community Property and Inter-Spousal Transactions, 19 BAYLOR L. REV. 20, 46 (1967).
Texas has become the vanguard of change in this regard, for the wife has now achieved
total equality in management rights. See TEx. FAMILY CODE ANN. § 5.22 (1975);
Cooper v. Texas Gulf Indus., Inc., 513 S.W.2d 200, 202 (Tex. 1974). See also Note,
6 ST. MARY'S L.J. 933 (1974).
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tributed to the partnership all of their time and efforts and the use of and
revenue from all their individual capital."' 15 Furthermore, the "profits" of
the partnership are equally divided on dissolution of the marriage. 16 This
of
equal division is one of the features of the ganancial system which most
7
the American community property states have completely altered.'
THE TEXAS COMMUNITY PROPERTY SYSTEM

Within the Texas marital property system there are three estates which exist concurrently within a marital relationship: the wife's separate estate, the
community estate (in which each spouse owns a vested undivided one-half
interest), and the husband's separate estate.' 8 The Texas Constitution de-

fines community property merely by designating a wife's separate property.' 9
A definition of community property is also included in the Texas Family
Code which describes the property in terms of both spouses but does not en20
large the constitutional definition.
In a divorce the court must first classify any property involved in the marriage as either separate or community as determined by the constitutional definition. 2 1 Once the estates have been clearly identified the court can render
15. Huie, Commentary on the Community Property Laws of Texas, 13 TEAx. REv.
CIV. STAT. ANN. § 1, at 2 (1960). See also Jackson, Community Property and Federal
Taxes, 12 Sw. L.J. 1, 2 (1958); Vaughn, The Policy of Community Property and InterSpousal Transactions,19 BAYLOR L. REV. 20, 40 (1967).
16. Huie, Commentary on the Community Property Law of Texas, 13 TEx. REV.
Crv. STAT. ANN. § 1, at 2 (1960).
17. Six of the eight states allow a district court to exercise its discretion when dividing the community property. California and Louisiana are the only states which require
an equal division like the ganancial system. See CAL. CIv. CODE ANN. § 4800 (Deering
1972); IA. CIv. CODE ANN. art. 2406 (West 1971).
18. TEx. FAMILY CODE ANN. § 5.01 (1975).
19. TEx. CONsT. art. XVI, § 15. See also Commission v. Wilson, 96 F.2d 766, 76869 (5th Cir. 1935). Although the constitution defines the separate property of the wife
alone, the Texas Supreme Court has held that under the "implied exclusion" method all
other property of the spouses is community property. See Graham v. Franco, 488 S.W.
2d 390, 392 (Tex. 1972); Arnold v. Leonard, 114 Tex. 535, 540, 273 S.W. 799, 802
(1925).
20. Separate property under both the constitution and the Family Code includes
property acquired by a spouse before marriage, property acquired during marriage by
gift, devise or descent, and the separate property created by a partition agreement of
the parties; all other property is community property. TEx. CONST. art. XVI, § 15; TEx.
FAMILY CODE ANN. § 5.01, 5.42 (1975).
The legislature is prohibited from enlarging
the constitutional definition. Arnold v. Leonard, 114 Tex. 535, 540, 273 S.W. 799, 802
(1925).
21. Cooper v. Cooper, 513 S.W.2d 229, 232 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [1st Dist.]
1974, no writ); Davis v. Davis, 495 S.W.2d 607, 610 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1973,
writ dism'd). See also Comment, PartitioningCommunity Property, 2 ST. MARY's L.J.
219, 220 (1970). A court when classifying the property employs the statutory presumption that on divorce all property is presumed to be community property. Tax. FAMILY
CODE ANN. § 5.02 (1975). This is a strong presumption but the party who asserts otherwise may rebut it by "tracing" his separate property from the inception of its title and
proving it remained separate. For an excellent review of the law of tracing, see Corn-
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an equitable division. 22 This area of the Texas community property system
is distinctly different from the Spanish ganancial system, for the legislature
has instructed the courts to carry out this division, not equally, but in a man'23
ner which the court deems "just right."
Since 1841 the Texas courts have been empowered by the legislature to
exercise discretion in dividing the property of spouses upon divorce. 24 Abuse
of this discretion has been alleged many times on appeal but appellate courts
have been reluctant to find such abuse.2 5 The extent of this broad power
is illustrated by the fact that even if a verdict is rendered by a jury as to
how the property should be divided, it is the court "and not the jury that
'2 6
is charged with the responsibility of making a division of the property.
The extent to which the district court may exercise its discretion can be
seen from some of the early and present day cases. 'In Fitts v. Fitts27 the
Texas Supreme Court recognized that the community property of the spouses
was the primary fund which should be the subject of an equitable division,
and expressly acknowledged the trial court's power in certain cases to subject the separate property to charges "especially in favor of the wife" to bring
about a just division. 28 Charges brought against the separate property of the
husband were not considered divestiture of title to realty and therefore were
held to be permitted by the statute. 29 Trimble v. Trimble,3 0 decided the
ment, The Commingling of Separate and Community Funds: The Requirement of
Tracing in Texas, 6 ST. MARY's L.J. 234 (1974).
22. Comment, Partitioning Community Property, 2 Sr. MARY'S L.J. 219, 220
(1970).
23. TEx. FAMILY CODE ANN. § 3.63 (1975).
24. "Until revised in 1969 the basic Texas divorce law dated back to An Act Concerning Divorce and Alimony §§ 1-14 [1841] Tex. Laws 19-22, 2 H. Gammel, Laws
of Texas 483-86 [1898]." McKnight & Raggio, Family Law, 25 Sw. L.J. 34 n.1
(1971). The district court's discretion in this area is so wide as to be almost unlimited.
Daniels v. Daniels, 490 S.W.2d 862 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1973, no writ); Berdoll
v.Berdoll, 398 S.W.2d 397, 399 (Tex.Civ. App.-Austin 1966, no writ); Barry v. Barry,
162 S.W.2d 440, 442 (Tex. Civ. App.-Galveston 1942, no writ); Hamm v. Hamm, 159
S.W.2d 183, 185 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1942, no writ).
'25. See, e.g., Hudson v. Hudson, 308 S.W.2d 140, 141 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin
1957, no writ); Stanley v. Stanley, 294 S.W.2d 132, 137 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo
1956, ref'd n.r.e.); Bush v. Bush, 237 S.W.2d 708, 710 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1950,
no writ); Bagby v. Bagby, 186 S.W.2d 702, 706 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1945, no
writ).
26. Bagby v. Bagby, 186 S.W.2d 702, 705 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1945, no
writ). See also Becker v. Becker, 299 S.W. 528, 530 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1927,
no writ). The discretionary power of a trial court judge has been described by Justice
Funderburk: "The writer cannot escape the conviction that in practical effect the exercise of judicial discretion by a trial judge means doing as he pleases, unguided by law
....
.Barger
v. Mineral Wells Clay Prod. Co., 80 S.W.2d 333, 334 (Tex. Civ. App.Eastland 1935, no writ).
27. 14Tex. 443 (1855).
28. Id. at 450 (emphasis added). The emphasis illustrates that very early inthe
history of Texas a wife was favored ina divorce.
29. Id. at 450. The same rationale can be seen inlater cases. See, e.g., Hedtke
v.Hedtke, 112 Tex. 404, 410, 248 S.W. 21, 22 (1923); Rice v.Rice, 21 Tex. 58, 69
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same year as Fitts, held that, considering the particular equities involved, a
decree granting two-thirds of the community property to the wife and onethird to the husband was not an abuse of discretion. 31 Thus, it appears that
the early interpretation of the degree of trial court discretion over community
property allowed the court to make as unequal a division as it deemed right.
Tide to separate realty could not be divested, but there could be charges
levied against it, especially in favor of the wife.
The most perplexing problem with which courts have had to contend was
the prohibition against divesting a spouse of title to realty.3 2 Confusion existed for over one hundred years as to which estates were included in that
prohibition.3 3 Each spouse owns a vested undivided one-half interest in the
community estate; therefore it appeared that if the court was statutorily prohibited from divesting a spouse of title to realty, the prohibition includes the
title of each spouse in the community realty. The statute did not read "title
to separate realty," which would unequivocably apply only to separate property, but read "divest himself or herself of the title to real estate."'3 4 The
statute might very well have been intended to prohibit the courts from divesting tile to both separate and community realty. In one of the earliest
cases to encounter this controversy, the Texas Supreme Court held that the
statute was meant to prohibit trial courts from divesting a spouse of title to
either separate or community realty.3 5 The court stated that the decree
would operate to divest the husband of title to real estate even though the
(1858); Bush v. Bush, 237 S.W.2d 708, 710 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1950, no writ)
(wife awarded life estate in husband's separate realty held not to be divestiture of title
to realty).
30. 15 Tex. 19 (1855).
31. Id.at 20.
32. Article 4638, the predecessor of Section 3.63 of the Texas Family Code, reads:
The court pronouncing a decree of divorce shall also decree and order a division
of the estate of the parties in such a way as the court shall deem just and right,
having due regard to the rights of each party and their children, if any. Nothing
herein shall be construed to compel either party to divest himself or herself of the
title to real estate.
Tex. Laws 1841, An Act Concerning Divorce and Alimony §§ 1-14, at 19-22, 2 H. GAMMEL, LAWS OF TEXAS 483-86 (1898), cited in McKnight & Raggio, Family Law, 25 Sw.
L.J. 34, n.1 (1971). This section was amended by TEx. FAMILY CODE ANN. § 3.63
(1975).
33. See Comment, Hailey, Hilley, and House Bill 670-A Study in Partition and
Survivorship in Texas Community Property, 15 Sw. L.J. 613, 614 (1961). This confusion has been evidenced even incases of recent origin. See, e.g., Maisel v.Maisel, 312
S.W.2d 679 (Tex.Civ. App.-Houston 1958, no writ); Walker v.Walker, 231 S.W.2d
905 (Tex.Civ. App.-Texarkana 1950, no writ); Swanson v.Swanson, 229 S.W.2d 843
(Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1949, no writ); Puckett v. Puckett, 205 S.W.2d 124 (Tex.
Civ. App.-Texarkana 1947, no writ); Lewis v.Lewis, 179 S.W.2d 594 (Tex. Civ. App.
-Fort Worth 1944, no writ).
34. Tex. Laws 1841, An Act Concerning Divorce and Alimony §§ 1-14, at 19-22,
2 H. GAMMEL, LAWS OF TEXAS 483-86 (1898), cited in McKnight & Raggio, Family
Law, 25 Sw. L.J. 34, n.l (1971).
35. Tiemann v. Tiemann, 34 Tex. 522 (1871).
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realty was community property, and that it was not within the power of the
court to do so because of the prohibition in article 4638.36
This decision did not resolve the conflict; considerable confusion continued
to exist in regard to the proper interpretation of divestiture of title to realty
as contained in the statute. 8 7 In 1960 the supreme court in Hailey v.
Hailey8s finally settled this controversy:
That part of Article 4638 contained in the last sentence, which prohibits the divestiture of title by either party to real estate, has no application to the community
real estate but applies to the separate property
9
of each party.
After Hailey courts were prohibited from divesting a spouse of title to separate realty, although they could "charge" the separate estate of a spouse with
the support of the other spouse. 40 A court could also defeat title and interest
to community realty by vesting the entire title to all the community realty
in one spouse. 4 1 Thus, after Hailey the law appeared to be well settled.
The controversy was inadvertently revived in 1969, however, when the legislature omitted the prohibition against divestiture of title to realty in enacting
Section 3.63 of the Family Code. 42 The immediate problem of interpretation was whether the courts would continue to follow Hailey in limiting the
prohibition to separate realty, or whether the courts would construe the
legislative omission as authorization to divest title to separate realty.
The recent case of Wilkerson v. Wilkerson 43 is an indication of the manner
in which the divorce courts might choose to deal with this problem. In Wilkerson the trial court held that the property at issue constituted the community property of the spouses even though the wife successfully traced a
certain portion of the purchase money to her separate property.4 4 It appears
that the trial court attempted to avoid the statutory omission problem by finding that the separate interest and the community interest together amounted
36. Id. at 525. The decree of the trial court stated "all title or claim set up to the

same [community realty] by defendant [husband] is hereby annulled and vacated." Id.
at 524-25.
37. Cases cited note 33 supra.
38. 160 Tex. 372, 331 S.W.2d 299 (1960).
39. Id. at 376, 331 S.W.2d at 303.
40. Hedtke v. Hedtke, 112 Tex. 404, 409, 410, 248 S.W. 21, 22-23 (1923); Fitts
v. Fitts, 14 Tex. 443, 450 (1855); Ex parte Gerrish, 42 Tex. Crim. 114, 116, 57 S.W.
1123, 1124 (1900).
41. See, e.g., Reardon v. Reardon, 163 Tex. 605, 607, 359 S.W.2d 329, 330 (1962)
(relied on Halley for authority).
42. TEX. FAMILY CODE ANN. § 3.63 (1975). One of the original drafters of the
Family Code believes it was an oversight or a draftsmen's error. See McKnight, Matrimonial Property, 27 Sw. L.J. 27, 39 (1973). In May 1966 Professor McKnight was
designated by the Family Code Council as Director of its Family Code project. McKnight, Recodification of MatrimonialProperty Law, 29 TEx. B.J. 1000, 1002 (1966).
43. 515 S.W.2d 52 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1974, no writ).

44. Id. at 55
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to community property, 45 for by so doing a court can divest a spouse of title
to realty which it has determined to be community property. 46 In affirming
the disposition the Tyler Court of Civil Appeals appears to have disregarded
that the separate estate of the wife, even when mixed with community, is
hers alone. 4 7 It is well settled that in a case where funds from both the wife's
separate estate and the community estate are used to purchase property,
these estates assume the status of "a sort of tenancy in common between the
separate and community estates."' 48 In Wilkerson the court stated, "[iln
her suit for a divorce and division of property, appellant, in effect, called on
the court to partition the [property in issue] . . . . 49 Therefore, the court
could have chosen to achieve a result more consistent with the principles
governing the partition of property held by tenants in common by following
the rule stated in Chace v. Gregg.50 That case involved a petition of partition
land between the devisees of a husband who had bequeathed certain lands
to his wife and son. Discussing the basic nature of such a partition the court
said,
A partition between joint owners . . . has the effect only to dissolve

the tenancy in common, and leave the title as it was 'before, except to
locate such rights as the parties may have, respectively, in the distinct
parts of the premises, and to extinguish such rights in all other portions of
that property. 5 '
Partition suits are proceedings in equity5 2 and therefore consideration is
given by a court to adjusting the equities between the parties. 53 In a partition action not involving a divorce the particular equities involved often concern reimbursement to one of the co-tenants for expenditures or improvements on the property. 54 It is difficult to comprehend how such reimbursements can be equated to the equitable considerations involved in dividing
property in a divorce suit.5 5 'Fault, future earning ability, and age are some
of the factors which a court considers in a partition of marital property.50
45. Id. at 55.
46. Hailey v. Hailey, 160 Tex. 372, 376, 331 S.W.2d 299, 302-303 (1960).
47. See Gleich v. Bongio, 128 Tex. 606, 610-11, 99 S.W.2d 881, 883 (1937).

48. Id. at 610-11, 99 S.W.2d at 883.
49. Wilkerson v. Wilkerson, 515 S.W.2d 52, 56 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1974, no
writ).
50. 88 Tex. 552, 32 S.W. 520 (1895).
51. Id. at 558, 32 S.W. at 522 (emphasis added).
52. Thomas v. Southwestern Settlement & Dev. Co., 132 Tex. 413, 424, 123 S.W.2d
290, 296 (1939).
53. See, e.g., Tompkins v. Hooker, 200 S.W. 193, 197 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana
1917, no writ); Johnson v. Johnson, 191 S.W. 366, 369 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana
1917, no writ).
54. Cleveland v. Milner, 141 Tex. 120, 127, 170 S.W.2d 472, 476 (1943); Whitmire
v. Powell, 103 Tex. 232, 236, 125 S.W. 889, 890 (1910).
55. Wilkerson v. Wilkerson, 515 S.W.2d 52, 55 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1974, no
writ).
56. Id. at 55.
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These same factors, however, are never taken into account in a partition between co-tenants who are not spouses. In a non-marital partition without
such considerations the end result is protection and enforcement of vested
legal rights in property, whereas under the current method of marital property
partition these vested property rights are frequently summarily extinguished
under the discretion of the trial court. The right of married individuals to
own property would be better protected if the principle of partition pronounced in Chace were adhered to in divorce actions. In Wilkerson the
rights of the parties in the disputed property were obvious; the wife and the
community each had a vested right in the property in proportion to the
amount each had contributed to the purchase price. 57 The partition would
have been more equitably accomplished if the court had determined the rights
of the parties in accordance with Chace,5 8 thus more strictly protecting the
right of individuals, even as spouses, to own property.
Wilkerson was the first case decided after the enactment of Section 3.63
of the Texas Family Code in which a spouse was divested of separate property. That divesture was accomplished through the court's interpretation of
the legislative intent behind section 3.63: since the statute did not specifically limit the discretionary powers of courts in divorce to the community
property, the Tyler court found that such discretion also extended to the parties' separate estates. 59 A more realistic construction of the statute would
have resulted in a finding that the statute's use of the term "estate" in the
singular allows no other interpretation than to mean only the community
6
estate.
In Texas there are three estates which exist concurrently within a marriage-the wife's separate estate, the community estate, and the husband's
separate estate. 61 Had section 3.63 included the term "estates" in the plural,
then all three of these estates would obviously have been intended to be included. 62 There is only one estate common to both parties in the marriage,
and that is the community estate. Therefore by the term "estate of the parties" only the one common estate of both parties could have been intended.
57. Id. at 55; see Gleich v. Bongio, 128 Tex. 606, 610-11, 99 S.W.2d 881, 883
(1937).
58. Chace v. Gregg, 88 Tex. 552, 558, 32 S.W. 520, 522 (1895).
59. Wilkerson v. Wilkerson, 515 S.W.2d 52, 55 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1974, no
writ).
60. See McKnight, Dissolution of Marriage,5 TEx. TECH. L. REV. 320, 338 (1974).
61. TEx. FAMILY CODE ANN. § 5.01 (1975).
62. Washington, another community property state, has statutorily designated the
estates which are subject to division to include both "community and separate property."
Wash. Laws 1st Extra Sess. 1973, ch. 157, § 8, at 840. Community and separate property of the parties cannot be construed to mean other than the three estates which exist
in marriage. The Texas Legislature could have expressed its intent in the same manner
bad they wished tO dQ sq,
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The mere omission of the prohibition as to separate realty without a change
in the word "estate" from the singular to plural should not empower the divorce courts to decide that legislative authorization now exists to divest title
to separate realty.
The language of section 3.63 has been described by Professor McKnight
as a draftsmen's error and a legislative oversight, 63 and the Wilkerson decision illustrates that courts may interpret section 3.63 to mean other than that
which was intended by the Texas Legislature. 6 4 If the legislature had intended to endow the courts with a power which had been denied them for
approximately 130 years, surely the legislature would have drafted the statute
in such a manner so as to unequivocably vest in the courts power to divest
title to separate realty.
Arizona, another community property state, has adopted language almost
identical to Texas Article 4638 into its divorce statute. 65 The divorce courts
of that state had a similar problem regarding the intention of the legislature
by the use of the singular "property" of the parties. The Arizona Supreme
Court in Collier v. Collier6 6 interpreted this language to refer only to the community property:
Although this section provides: 'On entering a decree of divorce the
court shall order such division of the property of the parties as to the
court shall seem just and right', the phrase 'the property of the parties'
can only refer to the community property of the parties. 7
By emphasizing the critical phrase "of the property of the parties," it appears

that the court was addressing the issue of the use of the singular "property"
instead of "properties." The use of the term "property" instead of "estate"
63. Professor McKnight stated:
The commentary of the draftsmen distributed to the members of the committee was
simple and concise with respect to this provision [section 31.63]: This is a codification of the present law.
McKnight, Matrimonial Property, 27 Sw. L.J. 27, 39 n.95 (1973). It amounted to a
mere unintentional legislative omission as Professor McKnight later stated:
When Section 3.63 was drafted and presented to the legislature in 1969, another
oversight occurred. The proviso against divestiture of realty had been dropped out
of the proposed revision, though the section was presented to the legislature as unchanged.
Id. at 39.
64. Other courts have held that a district court has the power to divest separate title
to realty but Wilkerson is the first case where a court actually exercised such power.
See, e.g., Schreiner v. Schreiner, 502 S.W.2d 840, 849 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio
1973, writ dism'd); In re Marriage of McCurdy, 489 S.W.2d 712, 718 (Tex. Civ. App.Amarillo 1973, no writ); Medearis v. Medearis, 487 S.W.2d 198, 200 (Tex. Civ. App.Austin 1972, no writ).
65. See ARIZ. REv. STAT. ANN. § 25-318 (1956).
66. 242 P.2d 537 (Ariz. 1952).
67. Id. at 541 (court's emphasis). The court later stated that their interpretation
was inescapable due to the inclusion in the statute of the prohibition as to separate realty. Id. at 541. Although Texas has dropped that prohibition, the retention by the
legislature of the singular "estate" can have only one logical interpretation, that is the
community estate.
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by the Arizona Legislature does not detract from the court's interpretation
for the two words may be used interchangeably. 6
There is a further problem involved in the statutory authority for division
of the estate of the parties. The Texas Constitution defines community property,6 9 and this definition may not be altered by either the courts or the legislature:
We have no doubt that the people in adopting the Constitution in
1845, as in 1876, understood that it was intended to put the matter of
the classes of property constituting the wife's separate estate beyond legislative control. Thereby both the wife and the husband were given
constitutional guaranty of the status of70 all property .

. .

. Our duty is

plain to give effect to the peoples' will.
Thus, by dividing the community estate between the parties courts create
separate property, and by assigning the separate property of one spouse to
the other they transform the separate property of one spouse into the property
of the other. There is no provision in the Texas Constitution for creating
separate property in this manner.
The legislature has previously followed the constitution by defining separate property in Section 5.01 of the Family Code and by incorporating the
constitutional provision for a partition agreement into section 5.42.71 To enable section 3.63 to remain viable under the constitution and in order to retain the basic constitutional definition of community property, it is necessary
to correct its present inconsistency with the Constitution. The legislature and
the courts in the future should answer the constitutional question as stated
by Professor McKnight:
In the light of the constitutional definition can the divorce court in dissolving a marriage go beyond partition to change community property
68. Hedtke v. Hedtke, 112 Tex. 404, 408, 248 S.W. 21, 22 (1923). CAL. Civ. CODE
ANN. § 4800 (Deering 1972), like Texas section 3.63, makes no mention of the sep-

arate estate of either party and the California Supreme Court has held that the court
in a divorce proceeding has no jurisdiction to deal with the separate property of a spouse.
Allen v. Allen, 113 P. 160, 162 (Cal. 1911); accord, Middlecoff v. Middlecoff, 324 P.2d
669, 672 (Cal. Ct. App. 1958). Section 4800 of the California Civil Code specifically
designates the community property as the only property within the jurisdiction of the

court. It is submitted that, Texas uses the word estate to refer to community property
and therefore without specific mention of the power of the court as to the separate estate

of each party there is no jurisdiction of the court over the separate estate of either party.
69. Tax. CONST. art. XVI, § 15.
70. Arnold v. Leonard, 114 Tex. 535, 540, 273 S.W. 799, 802 (1925); accord, Williams v. McKnight, 402 S.W.2d 505, 508 (Tex. 1966). Arnold also holds:
It is a rule of construction of constitutions that ordinarily when the circumstances
are specified under which any right is to be acquired there is an implied prohibition
against legislative power to either add to or withdraw from the circumstances specified.
Arnold v. Leonard, 114 Tex. 535, 540, 273 S.W. 799, 802 (1925).

Therefore the legis-

lature may not give to a spouse a new right to the other spouse's property or create a
new right (ownership) out of the community property.
71. TEx. FAMILY CODE ANN. § 5.42 (1975).
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into separate property72 or convert the separate property of one spouse
into that of the other?

DIVORCE IN THE COMMUNITY PROPERTY STATES

In searching for a practical answer to this question the legislature might
consider the laws and practice in the other community property states. These
seven states may be divided into four categories according to their treatment
of the division of property on divorce: those which (1) allow the court discretion to divide community property but specifically prohibit divestiture of
title to separate property; 73 (2) allow the court discretion to divide the community property with no prohibition as to divestiture of title to separate property; 74 (3) allow the court discretion to divide community property and divest
title to separate property; 75 and those which (4) allow the court no discretion

and require equal division of the community property with no authority over
76
separate property.
The Arizona statute retains the proviso prohibiting divesititure of separate
property. 77 In addition Arizona has made provision for a lien against separate property for securing payment of any equity which the other spouse may
have in such property or to secure payment of any allowance for the wife
or minor children. 78 Similar provisions exist within the common law in
Texas.

79

Idaho recognizes no separate property except the separate homestead.8 0
The Idaho statute also provides for "punishment" of the guilty spouse in a

divorce suit by specifically allowing the court to assign to the "innocent" party
72. McKnight, Matrimonial Property, 27 Sw. L.J. 27, 39 (1973). In addressing
itself to the above problem the legislature should also correct an additional flaw in that
provision of section 3.63 which reads "having due regard for the rights of each party
and any children of the marriage." Under the Texas Constitution and statutes which
apply to community property, there is no provision granting to the children of a marriage any rights whatsoever in the property or estates of that marriage. The principle
of "forced heirship" existed under the Spanish ganancial system whereby the children
had a vested right to a portion of their parents' property which could not be disposed
of by a testator parent. See Budd v. Fischer, 17 Tex. 423, 426 (1856); Crain v. Crain,
17 Tex. 80, 90 (1856); Hagerty v. Hagerty, 12 Tex. 456 (1854). Today no such provision of "forced heirship" exists within Texas law; therefore section 3.63 is untenable in
this regard. The phrase in section 3.63 pertaining to the children of the marriage should
be eliminated by the legislature, for it is mere surplusage which district courts may construe as a property right of the children.

73. ARiz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 25-318 (Supp. 1972).
74. IDAHO CODE ANN. § 32-712 (Supp. 1974); NEV. REV. STAT. § 125.150 (1973).
75. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 22-7-6 (Supp. 1973); Wash. Laws 1st Extra Sess. 1973, ch.
157, § 8, at 840.
76. CAL. CIv. CODE ANN. § 4800 (Deering 1972); LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 2406
(West 1971).
77. Aruz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 25-318(A) (Supp. 1972).
78. Id. § 25-318(D).
79. See, e.g., Fitts v. Fitts, 14 Tex. 444, 450 (1855).
80, IDAHO CODE ANN. § 32-712(3) (Supp. 1974).

Published by Digital Commons at St. Mary's University, 2022

11

St. Mary's Law Journal, Vol. 7 [2022], No. 1, Art. 13

ST. MARY'S LAW JOURNAL

.[Vol. 7: 209

for a limited period the separate homestead property of the guilty party."'
Although section 3.63 makes no similar provision, the principle has been applied in Texas.8 2 Nevada allows divorce courts the same discretion as 'Idaho
except it enlarges a court's authority to the extent that any of the separate
realty or personality of the husband may be "set apart" for the support of
the wife or children.8 3 The New Mexico statute vests divorce courts with
discretion to award either separate property or community property to a
spouse.8 4 Washington in like manner allows complete discretion as to either
of the estates of the parties and specifically provides "property . . . of the
parties, either community or separate."'8 5 The Tyler Court of Civil Appeals'
construction of section 3.63 in Wilkerson v. Wilkerson"8 construes our statute as being similar to those of Washington and New Mexico. Unlike the
statutes in those two states, however, section 3.63 contains no specific reference to the separate estate of a spouse.
California and Louisiana are the only community property states that retain the basic ganancial principles of absolute equality in the property division
on dissolution of the marriage. The partnership concept of marriage as propounded by the ganancial system seems to fit well in today's world where
a woman is considered her husband's equal and partner. California and
Louisiana do not allow the divorce court any discretion in dividing the-community property of the spouses, nor does the court have jurisdiction over any
of the separate property.8 7 Their statutes require an equal division of the
community property,88 precisely what the ganancial system allowed.8 9 'Under
the current California statute the discord and acrimony inherent in a divorce
proceeding has been reduced due to the elimination of the incentive-unequal property division-which prompted accusations of wrongful conduct. 90
81. Id. Further court interpretation of this statute has emphasized the punishment
aspect of the statute. See Nielsen v. Nielsen, 394 P.2d 625, 628 (Idaho 1964)."
82.: See Hedtke v. Hedtke, 112 Tex. 404, 411, 248 S.W. 21, 23 (1923); McGarraugh
v. McGarraugh, 177 S.W.2d 296, 301 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1944, writ dism'd).
83. NEV. REV. STATi. § 125.150(3) (1973).
84. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 22-7-6 (Supp. 1973).

85. Wash. Laws 1st Extra Sess. 1973, ch. 157, § 8, at 840.
86. 515 S.W.2d 52 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1974, no writ).
87. CAL. CIV. CODE ANN. § 4800 (Deering 1972); LA. CIrv. CODE ANN. art. 2406
(West 1971). See also Allen v. Allen, 113 P. 160, 162 (Cal. 1911); Middlecoff v. Middlecoff, 324 P.2d 669, 672 (Cal. Ct. App. 1958); Butler v. Butler, 228 So. 2d 339 (La.
Ct. App. 1969).

88. CAL. CIV. CODE ANN. § 4800 (Deering 1972); LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 2406
(West 1971).
89. Huie, Commentary on the Community Property Law of Texas, 13 TEx. REV.
Civ. STAT. ANN. § 1, at 2 (1960).
90. Comment, The End of Innocence: Elimination of Fault in California Divorce
California formerly allowed a court,
Law, 17 U.C.L.A.L. REV. 1306, 1309 (1970).

when exercising its discretion as to division of the community property, to consider the
amount of fault which could be attributed to either party. See Gabler, The Impact of
the ERA on Domestic Relations Law: Specific Focus on California, 8 FAMILY L.Q. 51,
83 (1974). This resulted in strife and discord between the spouses due'to their effoits
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Contrary to California, Texas allows a divorce court to consider fault as a
reason for awarding a disproportionate share of the community to either
spouse. 9 1
TEXAS DIVORCE AND THE ERA

The constitutional revision of the legal rights of men and women in Texas 92
should prompt a reconsideration of some aspects of the Texas divorce practice:

A serious question arises as to the continued validity of the traditional
approach of the Texas courts to the questions arising in divorce actions
such as the division of property of the parties . . in view of the adoption on November 7, 1972 of Article 1, Section 3a to the Texas Constituition, Vernon's Ann. Stat., reading: 'Equality under the law shall not

be denied or abridged because of sex. . .

.'

Consideration must . . .

be given to certain provisions of the recently enacted Family
Code .... 93
Section 3.63 of the Family Code appears to be in conflict with both the proposed federal Equal Rights Amendment (ERA) and the current Texas constitutional provision for equal rights in that although section 3.63 does not
literally discriminate against either spouse, its practical effect has been to burden one spouse unfairly by allowing unequal division of property. 94 Many
judicial divisions of property have been unfavorable to the husband, due in
part to the fact that the man has been the principle, and in most cases, the
only wage earner of the family. Many court decisions have been made with
this past history in mind and on the basis of compassion for a woman who
had given many years to help her mate in developing his abilities to support
to convince the divorce court of their innocence in order to induce the court to award
the innocent spouse the greater share of the community. See Gabler, The Impact of
the ERA on Domestic Relations Law: Specific Focus on California, 8 FAMILY L.Q. 51,
83 (1974).
91. See Wilkerson v. Wilkerson, 515 S.W.2d 52, 55 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1974,
no writ); Miller v. Miller, 463 S.W.2d 477, 480 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1971, writ ref'd
n.r.c.).
92. TEX. CONST. art. 1, § 3a.
93. Cooper v. Cooper, 513 S.W.2d 229, 231 (Tex.. Civ. App.-Houston [1st Dist.]
1974, no writ).
94. This might be termed de facto discrimination. As stated in Penn v. Stumpf,
308 F. Supp. 1238, 1244 (N.D. Cal. 1970): "A procedure may appear on its face to
be fair and neutral, but if in its application a discriminatory result ensues, the-procedure
may be constitutionally impermissible."
Concerning the viability of the California statute under the ERA it has been said:
"In terms of the ERA analysis, the no-fault equal property division provision in California appears to be a sex-neutral rule and thus passes muster under the ERA." Gabier, The Impact of the ERA on Domestic Relations Law: Specific Focus on California,
8 FAMILY L.Q. 51, 84 (1974). It appears that any statute which does not contain a
"no-fault equal property division" provision will not pass !'muster" under the ERA.
Texas with its current fault oriented unequal property division statute is not within the

spirit of the ERA.

Published by Digital Commons at St. Mary's University, 2022

13

St. Mary's Law Journal, Vol. 7 [2022], No. 1, Art. 13

ST. MARY'S LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 7: 209

the family. 95 Until recently this was a fine and noble reason for burdening
the more fortunate wage earning spouse, historically the husband, 9 6 with the
greater cost of divorce, but its vitality today is questionable in light of the
97
approaching equality of women in all spheres of life.
A significant 1974 decision of the Texas Supreme Court illustrates the type
of change which is necessary to render status involving husband and wife viable under the ERA provisions of the Texas and Federal Constitutions.
Without alluding to the existence of the ERA the Texas Supreme Court in
Cooper v. Texas Gulf Industries, Inc.98 concluded that the wife is now her
husband's equal with regard to the management of community property. 99
This conclusion was based on the belief that the Family Code abolished any
sex discrimination in this regard. 10 0 Cooper finalized the legislative mandate
for equality of the spouses regarding community property management. 01'
The legislature and the supreme court have improved the community property
system with respect to the only inequality which can be alleged to exist within
the system-the unequal management provisions.' 0 2 Yet neither has incorporated the provision for equal division of marital property, a concept which
is the very cornerstone of the systsem. 1°8
REVISING SECTION 3.63

Wilkerson v. Wilkerson'04 has created an urgent situation. It is well settled that a court of civil appeals, as an intermediary court, has the duty to
follow settled law until such time as it is changed by the supreme court.' 0 5
However, a suit for divorce in Texas generally does not come within the jurisdiction of the supreme court.' 0 6 Therefore, if civil appeals courts follow
95. See, e.g., Hudson v. Hudson, 308 S.W.2d 140 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1957,
no writ); Stanley v. Stanley, 294 S.W.2d 132 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1956, writ ref'd
n.r.e.); Bagby v. Bagby, 186 S.W.2d 702 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1945, no writ).
One court has held that the loss of an advantageous marriage can sustain an unequal
division. See Roberson v. Roberson, 420 S.W.2d 495, 503 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston
[14th Dist.] 1967, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
96. But see Earnest v. Earnest, 223 S.W.2d 681 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1949,
no writ) (a husband was favored in the unequal division).
97. Cooper v. Cooper, 513 S.W.2d 229, 231 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [1st Dist.]
1974, no writ).
98. 513 S.W.2d 200 (Tex. 1974).
99. Id. at 202.
100. Id. at 202.
101. Note, 6 ST. MARY's L.J. 933 (1974).
102. Discussion and authorities cited note 14 supra.
103. Huie, Commentary on the Community Property Law of Texas, 13 TEx. REv.
Civ. STAT. ANN. § 1, at 2 (1960).
104. 515 S.W.2d 52 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1973, no writ).
105. See, e.g., Schooler v. Tarrant County Med. Soc'y, 457 S.W.2d 644, 647 (Tex.
Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1970, no writ).
106. The supreme court has jurisdiction only if there is a disagreement among appellate courts on a question of law which is material to the decision or. if an appellate
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Wilkerson in the future, section 3.63 will continue to be interpreted in a manner contrary to the legislative intent-to allow a court power to divest title
10 7
to separate realty.
Reinstating the old prohibition of article 4638 would resolve only part of
the dilemma created by section 3.63. The power of a divorce court to alter
the definition of community property would still be unresolved. The present
constitution might possibly be amended in order to give constitutional authority for the legislative provision that courts may, on divorce, alter the nature
of the marital property, creating separate property out of the community estate.1 08
The other constitutional issue which was created by addition of the equal
rights proviso, could easily be eliminated by the adoption of the CaliforniaLouisiana model statute. 10 9 Section 3.63 would become viable under the
ERA if the legislature were to require an equal division of community property, allowing no judicial discretion, and add a provision prohibiting divestiture of title to any separate property.
Any prohibition which the legislature inserts in section 3.63 concerning divestiture of title to separate property must include all separate property, both
personal and real. Divestiture of title to personalty has historically been permitted due to what has been described as ancient legislative oversight." 0
The original definition of separate property in the constitution was phrased
in terms of land and slaves; therefore, the original divorce statute prohibited
court holds differently from a prior decision of an appellate court or the supreme court.
TEx. REv. Cirv. STAT. ANN. art. 1821(3), (6) (1964). In addition, the supreme court
may obtain jurisdiction of a divorce suit when there has been a dissenting opinion filed
by one of the justices of the court of civil appeals. Continental Cas. Co. v. Street, 364
S.W.2d 184, 185-86 (Tex. 1963). The decision of the appellate court is conclusive in
a divorce suit except in the circumstances mentioned. Id. at 185-86; Tx. REV. Civ.
STAT. ANN. art. 1821(3), (6) (1964).
107. In addition to Wilkerson, dicta in other recent civil appeals decisions has supported the interpretation that the court's discretion is not limited to community realty.
See Schreiner v. Schreiner, 502 S.W.2d 840 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1973, writ
dism'd); In re Marriage of McCurdy, 489 S.W.2d 712 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1973,
no writ); Medearis v. Medearis, 487 S.W.2d 198 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1972, no
writ).
108. The constitution has previously been amended to allow for the creation of separate property in a manner different from the original constitution. On November 2,
1948, Texas voted to amend the constitution to allow for partition of community property and in 1949 the 51st Legislature "passed article 4624a to implement the amendment." Olds, Partition of Family Property, 20 TEx. B.J. 573, 574 (1957). Prior to
that amendment partition of community property by agreement of spouses was not permitted. See Cox v. Miller, 54 Tex. 16, 25 (1880); Bruce v. Permian Royalty Co. No.
2, 186 S.W.2d 686, 687 (Tex. Civ. App.--Galveston 1945, ref'd w.o.m.); McDonald v.
Stevenson, 245 S.W. 777, 779 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1922, writ ref'd).
109. CAL. CIv. CODE ANN. § 4800 (Deering 1972); LA. Crv. CODE ANN. art. 2406

(West 1971).
110. McKnight, MatrimonialProperty, 27 Sw. L.J. 27, 38 (1973).
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divestiture as to these two items of separate property."' Later in 1845 when
the constitutional definition of separate property was altered to include not
only land and slaves but all types of property, the divorce statute was not
similarly amended. 112 This oversight has never been corrected to correspond
to what appears to be the intent of the drafters of the original divorce statute;
that is, to prohibit the divestiture of title to that which is defined as separate
1
property by the Texas Constitution. 3
There are other reasons why the legislature should adopt a California or
Louisiana type statute. In addition to reducing or eliminating the acrimony
involved in a divorce suit, a guaranteed equal division of the community
property will assure each spouse of retaining his or her share as provided by
the Texas Constitution. "14
It is an anomaly that the legislature and the courts guarantee a deceased
partner of a marriage more rights than the living partner of a dissolved marriage. Under the Probate Code a deceased's heirs are entitled to his property and undivided one-half interest in the community property." 5 This occurs as a matter of law even if the surviving spouse was ill treated by the
deceased throughout the marriage, had no education, or was old and incapacitated. These are the same factors which a divorce court considers when making a division of the property of the spouses upon divorce. 116 Unlike a divorce court, however, a probate court is not permitted to consider these factors and exercise its discretion even if the parties were contemplating a divorce due to the invidious conduct of the deceased. If a spouse is denied
the right to his partner's vested estates under the Probate Code, even though
the parties were contemplating a divorce, then a spouse should be denied the
right to his partner's vested estates upon divorce.
Another factor which the legislature should consider in revising section
3.63 is that a California-Louisiana type statute would be in the public interest
regarding the alienability of land."1 7 Under the current statute divorce courts
are permitted to award a spouse a determinable fee in the separate estate
111. Fitts v. Fitts, 14 Tex. 443, 449-50 (1855); McKnight, Matrimonial Property,
27 Sw. L.J. 27, 38 (1973).
112. Fitts v. Fitts, 14 Tex. 443, 449-50 (1855); McKnight, Matrimonial Property,
27 Sw. L.J. 27, 38 (1973).
113. TEx. CONST. art. XVI, § 15.
114. Id.
115. This is subject to the provisions found in the TEx. PROB. CODE ANN. §§ 38,
45 (1973) which specify the fractional amounts the heirs receive.
116. Some of the factors which a court may consider in exercising its discretion are:
[t]he age and physical condition of the parties, their relative need for future support, fault in breaking up the marriage, benefits the innocent spouse would have
received from a continuation of the marriage, the size of the estate and the relative
abilities of the parties.
Wilkerson v. Wilkerson, 515 S.W.2d 52, .55 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1974, no writ).
117. Comment, Permanent Alimony in Texas, 6 TEXAS L. REV. 344, 349 (1928).
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of the other spouse. 118 An award of a life estate can tie up land for the
life of the other spouse so that the holder of the title cannot dispose of the
land. 1 9 It is difficult to comprehend how the courts have ever justified
awarding a life estate in the separate realty of one spouse to the other spouse
and still have believed that they were adhering to the prohibition of article
4638 which prohibited divestiture of title to realty. The Texas Supreme Court
recognized in Spann v. City of Dallas1 20 that a property right consists not
merely of ownership and possession but also of the unrestricted rights of enjoyment and use.121 Without these, the property right is to some extent
destroyed because the value of property lies in its use. If the right of use is
denied the value of the property is annihilated and ownership is no more than
1 22
a "barren right.'
Adoption of the California-Louisiana model would also eliminate another
inconsistency in the Texas divorce laws. Texas is unique in that it does not
allow for the award of permanent alimony to either spouse.' 23 The courts
of this state, however, have repeatedly awarded what appears to be alimony
by another name,' 24 in that the separate property of the husband has often
been burdened with the support of his divorced wife.' 25 It is difficult to understand how this is not court ordered periodic payments upon a divorcealimony. 1 26 This inconsistency would also be cured by enacting a statute
requiring an equal division of the community estate and allowing no jurisdiction over the separate estate of either spouse.
A consideration which should be uppermost in the minds of the legislature
is contained within the principles of the Spanish ganancial system. The
foundation of that system is an equality of the spouses approximating the situation in a partnership. 1 2 7 As in a partnership the assets of the marriage
are divided equally on dissolution of the marriage.' 28 This partnership concept was nowhere more pertinent than in the western states, which in their
infancy adopted the community property system because
118. See, e.g., Hedtke v. Hedtke, 112 Tex. 404, 248 S.W. 21 (1923) (life estate
awarded to the wife); Bush v. Bush, 237 S.W.2d 708 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1950,
no writ); Farris v. Farris, 15 S.W.2d 1083 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1929, no
writ).
119. Comment, Permanent Alimony inTexas, 6 TExAs L. REV. 344, 349 (1927).
120. 111 Tex. 350, 235 S.W. 513 (1921).
121. Id. at 355-56, 235 S.W. at 514-15.
122. Id. at 356, 235 S.W. at 514-15.
123. Discussion and cases cited note 5 supra.

124. See Comment,Permanent Alimony inTexas, 6 TExAs L.REv. 344 (1927).
125. Id. at 344.

126. For a judicial definition of alimony in Texas see Francis v. Francis, 412 S.W.2d
29, 32 (Tex. 1967).
127. Huie, Commentary on the Community Property Law of Texas, 13 TEx. REv.
Civ. STAT. ANN. § 1, at 2 (1960); Vaughn, The Policy of Community Property and
Inter-Spousal Transactions, 19 BAYLOR L. REV. 20, 26, 40 (1967).
128. Huie, Commentary on the Community Property Law of Texas, 13 Tx.REV.
Civ. STAT. ANN. § 1,at 2'(1960).
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the factors which originally produced it [the community property system] were closely approximated. The women worked side by side with
their husbands to provide the necessities of life for the family 2 .9 . . [and]

to see that their marital partnership prospered and succeeded.1
With the approaching equality of women, which may be enhanced by passage
of the ERA in the near future, the marriage relationship assumes an even
greater resemblance to a partnership.' 30 Therefore like a partnership the assets or fruits of that partnership should be equally divided upon dissolution.' 3 '
CONCLUSION

Texas should enact a divorce statute which provides for a division of the
spouses' property in an equal, rather than an "equitable," manner. Such a
statute would not necessarily abolish all judicial discretion in this area since
property division should not always require a physical equality such as dividing one parcel of realty into two equal parcels. It should effect as nearly
as practicable a substantially equal division of the property. 132 'For example,
when a court is asked to divide the property of a marriage which contains
a profitable business which is community property, the court should award
the property to one spouse and compensate the other spouse for the value
of his share in the property. Such action by the court will avoid a forced
sale of a profitable venture. The compensation for the one spouse can come
from the other spouse's property so as to effect an equal division based on
the value of the estates divided.
The Texas Constitutional provision for equal rights requires a revision of
129. W. DE FUNIAK & M. VAUGHN, PRINCIPLES OF COMMUNITY PROPERTY § 11.1, at
25 (2d ed. 1971) (emphasis added).
130. See, e.g., Cooper v. Texas Gulf Indus., Inc., 513 S.W.2d 200 (Tex. 1974). As
a result of the Texas Supreme Court's decision in that case, which granted the wife total
equality in managing the community property, a Texas marriage appears to be more like

a partnership than its predecessor in the Spanish ganancial system.
131. The partnership concept has been proposed as a model for the entire United
States. See Note, The Implied Partnership: Equitable Alternative to Contemporary
Methods of PostmaritalProperty Distribution,26 U. FLA. L. REv. 221, 234-35 (1974).

The proposal is sound in light of present day realities:
The emerging view of the marital relationship disregards the unified entity concept [common law theory] and perceives the marriage as a bifurcated structure,
with the husband and wife acting within their respective roles toward achievement
of a common purpose.

Id. at 226. The effect of a dissolution of a marriage under the implied partnership theory would have the same effect as a dissolution within Texas under a California-Louisiana model:
The UPA is replete with references to the equality of partners as regards rights
to specific partnership property. Furthermore, recent decisions of Florida courts
[like Texas] have recognized that husband and wife are to be placed on equal foot-

ing in the eyes of the law. Consequently, upon dissolution . . . in the absence of
any specific agreement . . . distribution of the partnership property should be in
equal shares as nearly as practicable.
Id. at 234-35.
132. See, e.g., CAL. Civ. CODE ANN. § 4800(b)(1) (Deering 1972).
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Section 3.63 of the Family Code, and if the ERA is adopted as part of the
Federal Constitution, such a revision may be required by federal law. Unless
the legislature acts to remedy this situation,
[h]usbands and wives will never be truly equal in the eyes of the law,
and wives will continue to rely on judicial grace in the form of alimony
[or unequal property division] as compensation for efforts tendered during years of coverture unless such a method of property distribution,
or
33
its equivalent, is used when a marital relationship is dissolved.1
The adoption of the California-Louisiana model statute will guarantee a wife
property rights which are already hers under the Texas Constitution and, conversely, will treat husbands in a more just manner.
133. Note, The Implied Partnership: Equitable Alternative to Contemporary Methods of PostmaritalProperty Distribution,26 U. FLA. L. REV. 221, 234-35 (1974).
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